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This paper develops the first dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium analysis of the International
Great Depression. We construct a new version of Lucas?s (1972) monetary misperceptions model,
with a real shock (productivity) and a nominal shock (money supply). We use the model with a newly
assembled panel data set from 17 countries between 1929-33 to quantify the fraction of output change
and price change that is accounted for by these two shocks. Data limitations require us to develop
a new procedure for identifying the two shocks. The identified productivity shock has a large country-specific
component, and is highly correlated with actual productivity. The identified monetary shock has a
large common component, and is highly correlated with money supply changes. We find that the model
accounts for most of the variation in macroeconomic activity in the panel of countries. About 2/3 of
output change is accounted for by the real (productivity) shock, and virtually all of the change in nominal
prices is accounted for by the nominal (money supply) shock. The only variable we find that is highly
correlated with the productivity shock is stock prices. We conclude that financial friction models are
potentially the most promising class of models for understanding the Solow Residual during this period,
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Only recently has the dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) framework been
used to study Great Depressions. These studies, however, have typically focused on a sin-
gle country, and relatively few countries have been studied.1 This paper presents the ￿rst
DSGE study of the international depression, which allows us to exploit cross-country data
to study this worldwide event. Speci￿cally, we study changes in output and prices in 17
countries between 1930 and 1933 in a DSGE model that includes monetary shocks which
operate through imperfectly ￿ exible wages, and productivity shocks. We incorporate mon-
etary shocks because there is an empirical cross-country literature that has suggested that
de￿ ation combined with imperfectly ￿ exible wages, can account for a signi￿cant fraction
of the international Depression. We incorporate productivity shocks because much of the
DSGE-depression literature has focused on this shock, and has concluded that it is impor-
tant in understanding the Depression in a few countries, including the U.S. and Canada.
This paper considerably expands the scope of DSGE research on the Depression not only
by analyzing a panel of countries, but by developing a new model that incorporates both
productivity and monetary shocks, by accounting for changes in not just output but also in
prices, by testing the model economy in much more detail than is typically done in either
the depression or DSGE literature, and by investigating the primitive source of productivity
shocks.
We use the model to assess how much of the change in output and in de￿ ation can be
accounted for by monetary shocks, and how much by productivity shocks. The relative
importance of these two shocks in a panel data setting, and within a DSGE model is a
completely open question, because monetary shocks have been excluded from several DSGE
single-country analyses, and because the cross-country literature has not used DSGE mod-
els. Thus, studying the contribution of these two shocks is the natural starting point for
any DSGE analysis of the international Depression as they represent the canonical demand
(nominal) and supply (real) shocks that have been proposed for understanding this episode.
Our main ￿nding is that productivity accounts for most of the change in output in the
17-country panel, while monetary shocks account for virtually all of the change in prices.
Given the importance of productivity in accounting for output in the growth model, we
investigate the source of these productivity shocks. We ￿nd that the most promising avenue
for understanding the source of these productivity shocks is through ￿nancial shocks, as there
1Studies for the U.S. include Crucini and Kahn (1996), Cole and Ohanian (1999), Bordo, Erceg and Evans
(2000), Cole and Ohanian (2004), Harrison and Weder (2005), and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2006).
Kehoe and Prescott (2002)￿ s edited volume include studies of 4 other countries (Canada, France, Germany,
and Italy).
2is a very high correlation between productivity and real stock prices. Other explanations of
the productivity shocks, including capacity utilization or labor hoarding operating through
either de￿ ation, money, or exchange rates are inconsistent with the data.
The data for the 17 country panel are compiled from a number of sources, including very
recent measures for some of the countries. The dataset thus provides the most up-to-date
measures of international macroeconomic data for the interwar period. Section 2 statistically
summarizes the data, including the relationships between output, de￿ ation, productivity, and
real wages. The key feature from this summary is that productivity is strongly related to
output, but de￿ ation is only weakly related to output.
Section 3 presents the model economy. A new and quantitatively important feature of
the model is that the monetary nonneutrality is due to an information imperfection, as in
Lucas (1972). There is a range of values for the nonneutrality of money in our model, and
this variable nonneutrality is central for conducting the quantitative analysis and evaluating
the robustness of the results. Moreover, our model provides a simple way of introducing
the Lucas misperceptions feature into a fully-speci￿ed GE model with capital. The Lucas
non-neutrality has otherwise been largely excluded from the DSGE literature.
Section 4 discusses the quantitative procedures. Data limitations require us to develop
new procedures for constructing the shocks and for assessing the empirical validity of the
model and of the decomposition of output and de￿ ation into orthogonal productivity and
monetary components. Regarding the shocks, we treat total factor productivity (TFP) as
a latent variable because we do not have capital stocks and/or economy-wide labor for a
number of countries, and, as is standard, we also treat money shocks as a latent variable. In
particular, we construct the monetary and productivity shocks so that the model economy
exactly reproduces output and de￿ ation in each country and for each year between 1929-33.
We then assess the empirical plausibility of the analysis by comparing the time paths of
model variables to those in the data. We then account for the fractions of output and price
changes due to productivity and monetary shocks.
Section 5 compares the model variables to the actual variables, and shows that there is a
close conformity between the model and the data, as the model accounts for between 70-90
percent of the changes in productivity, money, consumption, and labor. Section 6 presents
the decomposition results, and evaluates the robustness of this decomposition by comparing
the model-based output decomposition to a statistically-based output decomposition, and
￿nd that they are almost identical.
Given the importance of productivity, section 7 tests various hypotheses about these
shocks to gain a deeper understanding of them. Speci￿cally, some classes of models with
￿nancial shocks or with trade shocks are observationally equivalent to productivity shocks in
3a stochastic growth model. To identify whether ￿nancial and/or open economy models with
these alternative shocks are promising for understanding productivity and the Depression,
we test whether the productivity shocks can be explained by ￿nancial and trade-related
variables, including de￿ ation, nominal and real interest rates, real exchange rates, various
monetary aggregates, a measure of banking panics, and the real value of the stock market.
Real stock prices are the only one of these variables that explain a substantial fraction of
the productivity shocks. Simulating our model with the productivity component explained
by the stock market, and with the monetary shocks, accounts for 73 percent of real output
change and 94 percent of price change in the panel of countries. These ￿ndings on the real
output change indicate that the most promising factor for jointly understanding productivity
change and the international Depression is a ￿nancial factor that a⁄ects real share prices
and productivity.
Section 8 compares our ￿ndings to other DSGE studies of the Great Depression, and
section 9 concludes.
2 Data Summary and Its Implications for Modeling
This section summarizes the data for our 17 country panel. We selected the countries on the
basis of consistent availability of data on real GNP and the GNP de￿ ator. Output is real
GNP divided by its 1929 value, and de￿ ation is measured as the annual log change in the
GNP de￿ ator. We also have compiled a number of other variables, including a wage index, a
labor index, a stockmarket index, industrial production, the exchange rate, nominal interest
rates, measures of the money supply, and the consumer and producer price indexes for most
countries. There are several primary sources for the data and we have used the most recently
constructed data.2 The Appendix describes the data and the sources.
This section summarizes the output and de￿ ation data that are the focus of the analysis.
We use the data to ￿rst assess whether a single-factor (single shock) model can primarily
account for both de￿ ation and output, or whether a multi-factor approach is required. This
is an important ￿rst step as we need to choose the number of shocks to include in a model
economy. We make this assessment of a single vs. multi-shock model by evaluating whether a
single-shock model is consistent with the output and de￿ ation data. If it is, this is interesting
in its own right, and it would lead us to restrict our attention to a single shock model.
2The countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. For all of these
countries were able to gather data on GDP or GNP and the de￿ ator; with the exception of Czechoslovakia
where we used the CPI as the price measure.
4To make this evaluation, we exploit the fact that in a log-linear framework, a single-factor
model implies that de￿ ation, ￿it; and output, yit; will (1) will be highly correlated, and (2)
will have idiosyncratic components (and the common components) that will be of similar
size. To see this clearly, note that the simplest single-factor model for these variables is
given:
yit = ￿ xt + ￿it
￿it = ￿(￿ xt + ￿it);
where ￿ is the idiosyncratic component, and ￿ is a normalization coe¢ cient3. We ￿rst de-
compose output and de￿ ation into their sample mean idiosyncratic (country-speci￿c) com-
ponents:
yit = ￿ yt + "it
￿it = ￿ ￿t + ￿it
We then calculate the correlation and the relative sizes of common and idiosyncratic com-



























Table 1 shows the correlation and relative size statistics for output and de￿ ation for the
depression (1930-33), which is the period which we analyze, and for the recovery (1934-38),
which is the focus of much of the empirical literature. We begin with the data from 1930-33.
The main ￿nding is that the data do not support a single factor model. Speci￿cally, the
correlation between output and de￿ ation is low or negative during several of the years in the
1930s, and the relative size of the idiosyncratic component of output is much larger than that
for de￿ ation. Table 2 extends this analysis by constructing these statistics for the cumulative
changes in de￿ ation and output between 1929-32.4 The relationship between the cumulative
changes of output and de￿ ation are similar to those presented in Table 1; output and prices
are uncorrelated (the correlation is -0.01), and the idiosyncratic component of output (55
3This simple model implies the two random variables are the same stochastic process, with a correlation
of 1 and the exact same relative size of the common and idiosyncratic components. Of course, this singularity
is broken by adding measurement error.
4We picked the period up through 1932 because almost all of the countries in the panel remained depressed
through at least this year.
5percent) is much larger than that of de￿ ation (18 percent). This means that countries had
relatively similar de￿ations, but had dissimilar output changes.
These data indicate that a factor with a large common component is responsible for
de￿ ation, and a factor with a large idiosyncratic component is responsible for output. The
￿ndings also suggest that de￿ ation will have limited explanatory power in a regression of
output on de￿ ation, not only because the correlation is low, but because the size of the
idiosyncratic component is so di⁄erent between y and ￿:
To demonstrate this, we ￿t a series of regressions that approximate various classes of
log-linearized business cycle models in which de￿ ation impacts output. In all cases, the
explanatory power of de￿ ation is low.
Output change in any log-linearized DSGE model which (i) abstracts from capital, and
(ii) in which de￿ ation is the only shock, can be written as yt = ￿￿t; where yt is the log-
deviation of output from its steady-state value, ￿t is the log of the change in the GNP
de￿ ator between t￿1 and t, and ￿ is the parameter governing the impact of log price change
on output. We estimate this equation using ordinary least squares (OLS). De￿ ation explains
23 percent of the sum of squared output deviations.5 The second regression adds lagged
de￿ ation to account for possible delayed impact of price change.6 The addition of lagged
de￿ ation increases the explanatory power from 23 percent to just 29 percent. The reason that
lagged values of de￿ ation do not account for output is the same as why contemporaneous
de￿ ation doesn￿ t: lagged de￿ ation is not highly correlated with output, and lagged de￿ ation
has a much larger common component than output.
We next add a constant term to both of the above regressions as a simple proxy for an
omitted factor to see if that changes the results. All of the de￿ ation regressors are statistically
insigni￿cant when a constant term is included. We then estimated a third regression with
country-speci￿c de￿ ation coe¢ cients to see if allowing for heterogeneity in the de￿ ation
response raises the importance of de￿ ation. We therefore estimated yit = ￿i + ￿i￿it + "it;
which includes a country-speci￿c constant term to allow for country ￿xed e⁄ects which is a
proxy for omitted country-speci￿c factors. The de￿ ation coe¢ cients are jointly insigni￿cant
in this regression.7 In summary, output has a much larger idiosyncratic component than
de￿ ation, a much smaller common component than de￿ ation, and neither contemporaneous
5The explanatory power of de￿ ation in this equation is an upper bound because we place no economic
restrictions on the size of the parameter ￿, and because we abstract from using instruments for de￿ ation.
6We do not report additional lags of logged price change in the regression because for most countries
price levels were very similar between 1927 and 1928, as well as between 1928 and 1929. De￿ ation typically
began in 1929 or afterwards.
7We also estimated a fourth regression with both contemporaneous and lagged de￿ ation, with country-
speci￿c coe¢ cients and ￿xed e⁄ects. The de￿ ation coe¢ cients were also insigni￿cant.
6nor lagged de￿ ation can account for much of output during the Depression.
The relationship between real wages and output provides further evidence that accounting
for output requires a factor other than de￿ ation. Table 3 shows the correlation between real
wages and output is positive in each year, through 1933, ranging between .28 and .48, and
only becomes substantially negative beginning in 1936. In contrast, the de￿ ation- sticky wage
hypothesis implies a negative relationship between real wages and output. Taken together,
these ￿ndings indicate that jointly accounting for output and de￿ ation in the 1930-33 period
in a log-linear model requires a multifactor approach. Moreover, the results presented here
indicate that the factor driving output has a large idiosyncratic component, and is a labor
demand shifter, as the correlation between real wages and output is positive.
We now compare the relationship between output and the real wage to those presented
in cross-country empirical studies of the 1930s: Bernanke and Carey 1996, and Eichengreen
and Sachs 1985. We discuss this in detail in the appendix, and we summarize the comparison
here. There are two key di⁄erences. One is regarding the time period, as we use data from
the Depression years (1930-33), while Eichengreen and Sachs use data just from the recovery
(1935), and Bernanke and Carey (1996) used data from 1931-1936, which includes some of
the depression years and several of the recovery years.8 The other di⁄erence is in terms
of measurement, as the other studies uses industrial production for output and a wholesale
price index instead of the GNP de￿ ator. These other studies report a negative relationship
between IP and the nominal wage index de￿ ated by the WPI, which stands in contrast to
our ￿ndings of a positive relationship between real GNP and the nominal wage de￿ ated by
the GNP de￿ ator.
We assess the source of these di⁄erences, and ￿nd that they are primarily due to the
di⁄erence in the period of analysis. Table A2 in the appendix presents the correlation
between wages de￿ ated by the wholesale price index, and alternatively by the consumer
price index, and industrial production for the 1930-37 period. The correlations between
these variables are similar to the correlation between real GNP and the wage divided by
the GNP de￿ ator. For example, all of the correlations are positive in 1930 and 1931, and
are quite negative in 1936 and 1937. Regarding the di⁄erences in measurement between our
study and the others, the appendix discusses in detail why the GNP de￿ ator or the CPI are
better price indexes to use to de￿ ate the wage than the WPI, which was used in Bernake and
Carey (1996) and Eichengreen and Sachs (1985). This comparison shows that the ￿ndings
8Choudri-Kochin (1980) is a well-known paper but is not comparable to our analysis. They do not report
correlations betwen output and prices or output and wages, but rather focus on the extent that output in
8 countries tended to be related to U.S. output, and whether prices in these countries were related to U.S.
prices. However, our analysis does include most of the countries analyzed by Choudri and Kochin.
7reported in these other studies do not have important implications for our analysis of the
1930-33 period.9
We now assess the relationship between productivity and output and ￿nd that the two
variables are similar. Figure 1 shows the log changes in output and productivity between
1930-33 for the seven countries for which we can construct aggregate productivity. We have
economy-wide total factor productivity (TFP) for ￿ve countries (Canada, France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, and the United States) and economy-wide labor productivity for two
other countries (Australia and Japan). The ￿gure shows a systematic relationship between
productivity and output: the countries with large depressions (Canada, France, Germany,
and the United States) had large productivity declines, and the countries with mild depres-
sions or expansions (Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom) did not have these large
productivity declines. The overall correlation of the two variables is 0.90.
These data suggest that productivity may be a key factor in accounting for output.
The positive relationship between real wages and output provides further evidence that
productivity is a potentially important shock. This positive correlation requires that one
of the shocks in the model needs to be a labor demand shifter, and a productivity shock
satis￿es this requirement.
Given these ￿ndings, the following section develops a model economy with two shocks -
productivity shocks and monetary shocks - to see if it can plausibly account for both de￿ a-
tion and output in the panel dataset. The model will feature nonneutral monetary shocks
operating through sticky nominal wages, as suggested by the de￿ ation literature. We will use
the model to determine the relative importance of each shock in accounting for de￿ ation and
output. In anticipation of the ￿nding that productivity will be important, we note here that
we will extend our analysis beyond the standard approach in the RBC literature that treats
productivity shocks as a purely exogenous process. Instead we will interpret productivity
shocks as the possible consequence of other economic factors. In particular, some classes of
models with ￿nancial intermediation and/or international trade are observationally equiva-
lent to a one-sector growth model with productivity shocks (for example, see Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2006), Backus and Crucini (2000), and Crucini and Kahn (2006)). We
therefore will test if the productivity shocks are signi￿cantly related to various ￿nancial and
9This change in the correlation between output and wages in the mid-late 1930s raises the possibility
that monetary forces/sticky wages may account for more of the recovery than the Depression, though testing
this hypothesis requires much more work and thus is well beyond the scope of this paper. This is not only
because the correlation is not a structural relationship, but because the correlations do not control for other
variables, such as productivity, and government policy changes that were adopted in many countries at the
mid-1930s. For example, Cole and Ohanian (2004) and Fisher and Hornstein (2002) argue that labor market
policies - not monetary policies - signi￿cantly a⁄ected post-Depression real wages in the U.S. and Germany,
respectively.
8trade variables. This extended analysis is the ￿rst step towards identifying promising classes
of deeper models for understanding the International Depression.
3 The Model
To develop the model, we follow the literature that proposes the monetary nonneutrality op-
erated through imperfectly ￿ exible nominal wages. We introduce nominal wage in￿ exibility
using an information imperfection in the spirit of Lucas (1972). In our model, households
choose labor supply without full information; they know the nominal wage when choosing
their labor supply, but they don￿ t know the price level; thus they face a signal extraction
problem when choosing labor supply. Our model brings the Lucas misperceptions para-
digm into the quantitative DSGE literature, which otherwise has largely ignored the Lucas
model due to the computational di¢ culties associated with the islands formulation. Our
formulation is simple, as it does not use an islands environment.10
With a log-linear approximation, our model is qualitatively identical to a standard pre-
determined wage model, but our model provides an information-theoretic foundation for
sticky wages and is a better quantitative tool for studying the Depression than a standard
predetermined wage model, as the nonneutrality of money is too large in this latter model.
The information-theoretic mechanism provides a deeper foundation for wage rigidity, and
quantitatively this model is preferable to a standard predetermined wage model. Speci￿-
cally, the standard predetermined wage model generates a depression that is much too large
for almost every country when the model is simulated with just monetary shocks that gen-
erate the observed de￿ ation rate. This implies that the standard sticky wage model requires
large positive productivity shocks to o⁄set the impact of de￿ ation and be able to account
for output change in the Depression. (These issues are detailed in section 4).
Therefore a model which has a smaller nonneutrality is required. Our misperceptions
model satis￿es this requirement, and moreover, the nonneutrality in our model takes on a
range of values, just as it does in the Lucas (1972) model. This is important because it
allows us to choose a nonneutrality value that is quantitatively plausible for the analysis,
and also lets us assess whether the decomposition results are sensitive to di⁄erent values of
the nonneutrality.11
10Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2006), Cole and Ohanian (2002), and others have shown that accounting
for the U.S. Depression requires a model with a ￿ productivity wedge￿and a ￿ labor wedge￿ . Our model will
generate both of these wedges. Moreover, though the model does not account for the details of high wages
stressed in the cartelization studies of Cole and Ohanian (2004) and Ohanian (2006), it can roughly capture
the high wage mechanism through the simple sticky wage channel.
11We could have reduced the size of the nonneutrality in the pre-determined wage model either by short-
9To conserve space, we present the main equations of the model. There is a large number
of identical households who have preferences over sequences of a cash good, a credit good,








￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)c2t
￿]
1=￿) + ￿log(1 ￿ nt)
o
; (1)
where c1 is the cash good, c2 is the credit good, and 1￿n is non-market time. The household
maximizes (1) subject to a wealth constraint and a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint:
mt + wtnt + rtkt + (Tt ￿ 1)Mt ￿ mt+1 + pt [c1t + c2t + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt];
ptc1t ￿ mt + (Tt ￿ 1)Mt:
Nominal wealth is the sum of initial cash holdings mt; labor income wtnt; capital income
rtkt, and a lump-sum monetary transfer from the government (Tt ￿ 1)Mt; where Tt is the
gross growth rate of the money stock: The household ￿nances cash carried forward, mt+1
and purchases of cash goods, credit goods, and investment (pt[c1t + c2t + kt+1 ￿ (1￿￿)kt]):






where Z is a technology shock that follows a ￿rst-order lognormal autoregressive process:
Zt = e
^ zt; ^ zt = ￿z^ zt￿1 + "zt;"zt ￿ N(0;￿
2
z):
The resource constraint is
C1t + C2t + Xt ￿ Yt:
The transition rule for capital is
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + Xt:
Monetary policy is given by exogenous changes in the gross growth rate of money.12 The
ening the length of the period in which wages are ￿xed or by constructing a multisector model in which only
some wages are ￿xed. Both of these approaches, however, are complicated. The ￿rst approach is complicated
because the data are available on only an annual frequency. The second approach is complicated because
it requires constructing an explict multisector model and dealing with a host of sectoral issues. Our mis-
perceptions model is simpler to use than either of these alternatives, and also provides a deeper theoretical
foundation for sticky wages.
12Our speci￿cation of exogenous, contractionary monetary shocks is consistent with the view stressed in
the International Depression literature that de￿ ation was caused by exogenous monetary shocks resulting
10money stock follows a ￿rst-order lognormal autoregressive process:
Tt = ￿ ￿e
^ ￿t; where ^ ￿t = ￿￿^ ￿t￿1 + "￿t;"￿t ￿ N(0;￿
2
￿):
The change in the money stock at the beginning of the period is thus equal to (Tt ￿ 1)Mt;
and the total money stock at the beginning of the period is: Mt+1 = TtMt
We now describe the timing of information and transactions. De￿ne the state of the
economy by St = (Kt; ^ zt￿1;^ ￿t￿1;"z
t;"￿
t): The lagged values of the shocks and their current
innovations are included separately because the model requires that households choose labor
supply before they observe ("z
t;"￿
t): There are two sub-periods. In the initial sub-period, the
household knows its own state (kt;mt), knows a subset of the state vector which we denote by
￿ St = (Kt;^ ￿t￿1; ^ zt￿1), and knows the nominal wage. Households do not know the realizations
of the money supply or technology innovations, while the representative ￿rm knows the full
state vector.13 The labor market opens, and the household and ￿rm make their labor market
choices. Note that households choose labor supply without knowing the full state vector.
In the second sub-period, the full aggregate state (St) is revealed, households receive their
monetary transfer from the government, workers rent capital to the ￿rm, output is realized,
and households acquire cash consumption goods, credit consumption goods, and investment





1￿￿ ￿ wtNt ￿ rtKt:
To construct a recursive formulation, we denote the law of motion for aggregate capital
by H(St); and we divide all date t nominal variables by Mt￿1Tt￿1: This implies that the
normalized beginning of period aggregate money stock is one (mt = 1): This stationary-
inducing transformation yields the following relationship between the quantity of money
chosen by the household in period t (~ mt+1) and the quantity of money that the household
from the gold standard (see Bernanke (1995) and Eichengreen (1992)).
13These assumptions about the household￿ s information set and the ￿rm￿ s information set are natural to
make in this environment, given that we are using this simple environment to stand in for a richer environment
in a multisector model producing heterogeneous consumer goods. In such an environment, ￿rms only care
about only four variables in the model: their product price, the state of their technology, and the rental
prices of labor and capital. It seems plausible that the ￿rm would know a lot about these variables just
prior to production. The households in such an environment would care about many more variables than a
￿rm would. In particular, the household would care about the entire distribution of prices in the economy.
It seems plausible that households would have only imperfect information about the entire distribution at
the start of the period. To match the larger informational frictions faced by households within our simple
model, we assume that ￿rms know the full state vector, which implies they know their technology and the
prices, while households do not know the current shocks.
11has at the start of period t + 1 (mt+1) :
mt+1 = ~ mt+1=Tt:
This transition rule implies that the money stock is constant over time, and we denote this
constant stock as M: We use this transition equation in the household￿ s budget constraint
below, substituting Ttmt+1 for ~ mt+1:
The representative household has a two-stage maximization problem. The Bellman equa-
tion for the household is given by
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subject to
mt + wtnt + rtkt + (Tt ￿ 1)M ￿ mt+1Tt + pt [kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt + c1t + c2t]
mt + (Tt ￿ 1)M ￿ ptc1t
and subject to the stochastic processes for the shocks. In the ￿rst stage maximization,
the household chooses its labor supply, given ￿ St and given the nominal wage. Thus, they
optimally forecast the technology and monetary shocks from their information set (￿ St;wt).
Their labor choice satis￿es:
￿￿=(1 ￿ nt) + wtEf￿tjwt; ￿ Stg = 0
The household equates the marginal utility of leisure to the expected marginal utility of
nominal wealth (￿t), scaled by the nominal wage. This expectational equation is solved
using standard signal extraction methods. To conserve space, we omit the de￿nition of
equilibrium, and refer the reader to Cole, Ohanian, and Leung (2005).
3.1 The Nonneutrality of Money and Imperfect Information
We now show how the information imperfection generates the nonneutrality. These results
are in the spirit of Lucas (1972), in that a standard signal extraction problem is used to
infer the values of the shocks from a subset of prices. For heuristic purposes, we consider an
i.i.d. money shock. The key equation is the household￿ s labor-leisure ￿rst-order condition.




= ￿Ef^ ￿tj^ wt; ￿ stg; (2)
where capital letters are steady-state values, and the other variables are log-deviations from
the steady state. With imperfect information, the household makes its labor supply decision
by forecasting the marginal value of nominal wealth (^ ￿t), conditioning on the nominal wage
(^ wt) and the restricted state vector (￿ st = (^ kt; ^ zt￿1;^ ￿t￿1)):The log-linearized equation for ^ ￿t
is given by





where D￿j is the linearized coe¢ cient for state variable j: Similarly, the log-linearized wage
equation is given by





Given ￿ st and ^ wt; the workers forecast











The solution to this standard signal extraction problem is
Ef^ ￿tj ^ wt; ￿ stg ￿ Ef^ ￿tj￿ stg = ￿ [^ wt ￿ Ef ^ wtj￿ stg];














The optimal forecast of ^ ￿t is given by
Ef^ ￿tj ^ wt; ￿ stg = [D￿k;D￿z;D￿￿;￿Dw"z;￿Dw"￿] ￿ st; (3)










13The parameter ￿ depends on variances of the shock innovations and on linearization
coe¢ cients. This parameter lies between 0 (maximum nonneutrality) and ￿1 (minimum
nonneutrality). It is 0 when the variance of money shocks is 0. This is because with log
utility, a productivity shock has no e⁄ect on the marginal value of nominal wealth, and thus
D￿"z = 0: It is ￿1 when the variance of productivity shocks is 0. This is because in this case
money shocks raise the nominal wage one-for-one, ceteris parabus, and reduce the marginal
value of nominal wealth one-for-one (Dw"￿ = 1; and D￿"z = ￿1):
Consider a negative money shock that ultimately lowers the price level by 10 percent.
This implies that the nominal wage must immediately fall to clear the labor market. If
￿ = ￿1 (￿z = 0) then money is neutral, as the nominal wage also falls 10 percent, and this
leads workers to raise their forecast of ^ ￿t by 10 percent. Consequently, there is no change in
any real variable. Next, consider the same shock, but the case in which is ￿ = 0 (￿￿ = 0)
The nominal wage must fall to clear the labor market, but in this case the household infers
that the lower nominal wage is entirely due to a negative real shock, rather than the negative
monetary shock. This misperception of a lower real wage leads households to reduce their
labor supply. Consequently, the equilibrium nominal wage falls less than the price level, and
employment and output fall.
This model has a smaller nonneutrality than a predetermined wage model because the
nominal wage in the misperceptions model partially responds to shocks to clear the labor
market, with the size of that response governed by the nonneutrality parameter ￿: (The Ap-
pendix presents the sticky wage model). Speci￿cally, the analogue of (2) in the predetermined




= ￿Ef^ ￿t j ￿ stg:
In the predetermined wage model, the di⁄erence is that households forecast the mar-
ginal value of nominal wealth given only the restricted state vector, ￿ st: This means that a
contractionary money shock qualitatively works the exact same way in the two models.
4 Quantitative Methodology
In this section we describe the procedure we use to (1) identify the shocks, (2) assess the
empirical plausibility of the shocks and the model ￿ndings, and (3) decompose output and
price change into orthogonal components due to productivity and monetary shocks. We
describe these procedures in some detail because to our knowledge they have not been used
before in the DSGE literature and because they can be easily used in any log-linearized
14model. They may be particularly useful for others studying the Depression, given the data
limitations in the 1930s,
4.1 Identifying Productivity and Monetary Shocks
Data limitations prevent us from using the standard approach to identifying productivity
shocks, as TFP can be constructed for 5 of the 17 countries. Regarding money shocks,
the identi￿cation of these shocks is complicated because money shocks are latent variables,
and there is no canonical method for estimating monetary shocks during this period. We
therefore develop a new procedure for identifying the two shocks. This procedure treats both
the productivity and monetary shocks as latent variables, and solves for the values of the
shocks so that output and the price level in the model for each country and for each year
matches the actual output and price data.
The procedure is simple to perform. Speci￿cally, we take the linear equations for the log
of the de￿ ator and the log of output and solve for the values of the technology and monetary
shocks that equate the model price and output variables to the actual data for these variables.
Thus, we are solving two linear equations (the equations for price and output) in the two
unknown values of the shocks. We match output and the price level because these are the two
variables that are the focus of the Depression literature, and this is required to decompose
the changes in these variables into monetary and productivity components. We will later
compare the constructed productivity and monetary shocks to the actual productivity and
money variables. This is described in the next subsection. Note that any study of the
Depression requiring shock identi￿cation will need to address the complications associated
with these data limitations
4.2 Model Evaluation Procedures
To evaluate the empirical plausibility of the shocks and the ￿ndings, we compare the shocks
and a number of the endogenous variables from the model to actual variables.
4.2.1 Evaluating the Shocks
Regarding productivity, we compare productivity in the model to actual productivity for
those countries for which it is available. TFP is available for 5 countries, and labor produc-
tivity from the industrial sector is available for 13 countries. Regarding the money stock, it
is necessary to adjust for money demand shocks to make an informative comparison between
the model money stock and the actual money stock, as the model does not include money
15demand shocks, but there is evidence of the shocks in the data. We did not add money
demand shocks to the model because they are irrelevant for the purpose of decomposing
output and price into productivity and monetary components, and thus would simply com-
plicate the analysis. Regarding the irrelevance of money demand shocks, Cole and Ohanian
(2001) showed that the impact of a money demand shock in this model is the same as that
of a money supply shock, conditional on the equilibrium price change. In other words, what
matters in this model is the change in the price level, not whether it is induced by money
demand or money supply shocks. Since we are matching de￿ ation exactly, this means that
the decomposition results will be invariant to the inclusion of money demand shocks. The
Appendix discusses this result.
We therefore compare model money to actual money by as follows. First, measure the
money demand shock from the data using the standard money demand relation:
^ mdt ￿ mt ￿ pt ￿ yt ￿ ￿it;
where m is the log of money stock, y is the log of real GNP, p is the log of the price level, ￿
is the interest semi-elasticity, and i is the nominal interest rate. If the model is generating
empirically plausible movements in the money stock, then the implied money demand shock
in the model, which is the di⁄erence between actual money and model money (mt ￿ ^ mt)
should be very similar to the identi￿ed money demand shock from the data (^ mdt): We will
thus compare the di⁄erence between the model money stock and the actual money stock to
the money demand shock from the data.
4.2.2 Evaluating the Endogenous Variables
Following the empirical evaluation of the two shocks, we will compare the time paths of
several endogenous variables - consumption, labor, and the real wage - in the model to those
in the data. To our knowledge, these comparisons of the time paths of di⁄erent variables for
a panel of countries have not been pursued in the broader DSGE business cycle literature.
4.3 Decomposition Procedure
To decompose output and prices into components from each shock, we ￿rst describe the
stochastic process for the shock innovations. The productivity and monetary shocks are the
16sum of a common component and idiosyncratic components:
"zit = ￿it + uzit;
"￿it = ￿￿it + u￿it:
where ￿it is the common component of the productivity and monetary shocks in country
i in period t, and uzit and u￿it are the idiosyncratic components of these two shocks. The
common component is normalized to have a unit impact on the productivity shock, and the
parameter ￿ scales the impact of the common component on the monetary shock.
Both components are Gaussian and mean zero. The variance of the common compo-
nents is ￿2
￿ and the variances of the orthogonal components are ￿2
uz and ￿2
u￿, respectively.
The common component ￿ allows for the possibility that the shocks may be correlated in
population.14
Constructing bounds on the maximum and minimum contributions of each shock for
output and de￿ ation is straightforward for mean zero shocks. However, we know a priori
that the monetary and productivity shocks from the Depression will not be mean zero because
we are analyzing a very unusual period of large output and price declines. We deal with this
non-zero mean complication as follows. To construct the lower bound on the contribution of
productivity for output, we ￿rst estimate ￿it by projecting "zit ￿ ￿ "z on "￿it ￿ ￿ "￿. Then we
take the residuals from this projection, along with the mean; as our estimate of uzit; which
we denote by ^ uzit; which consists of the mean of the productivity shock and the orthogonal
mean-zero productivity shock component.
We then feed ^ uzit into the model and construct output from this component alone, which
we denote as y
p
z;it: We then form the percentage of the sum of squared output deviations
explained by ^ uzit as:
R
2












where yit is the log-deviation of real output from its 1929 level in country i in period t: We
construct the lower bound on the contribution of productivity for price changes using an
analogous procedure, which we denote as R2
p;z. We use a symmetric procedure to construct




Finally, we note two details about this conformity measure, one regarding the sum of
14This possible dependence may be due to institutional features, such as a productivity shock inducing
an o⁄-setting monetary change to maintain gold points. For our purposes, however we will not pursue a
structural interpretation of this possible dependence.
17the contribution of the shocks, and the other regarding the contribution of any individual
shock. Regarding the sum of the shocks, if the shocks were mean zero, then R2
y;z +R2
y;￿ ￿ 1;
and equal to one only if the shocks were uncorrelated. However, with shocks that aren￿ t
mean zero, this inequality may not hold. We treat this complication as a sampling issue,
and report the conformity measures as constructed. We stress that this complication will
a⁄ect any analysis that decomposes the relative contributions of shocks for the Depression,
or for that matter, any other period with non-mean zero shocks.
Regarding the contribution of an individual shock for a particular endogenous variable, it
is possible that this could be negative. This generically arises in a multi-dimensional setting,
as there are no restrictions on (5) to guarantee that the contribution of shock ￿"" for variable
￿x";R2
x;"; is positive. This will tend to occur when the impact of one shock in isolation
changes an endogenous variable in the opposite direction than the variable actually moves.
For example, negative productivity shocks in isolation will tend to generate in￿ ation, rather
than de￿ ation, since lower output, ceteris parabus, induces higher prices. We will discuss
both of these issues in greater detail when we present the decomposition results in Section
8.
4.4 Parameter Values
Table 4 presents the parameter values in which the length of a time period is one year.
The discount rate is 0.95, the exponent on labor in the production function is 2/3, and the
depreciation rate is 7 percent per year. We choose the preference parameters ￿ and ￿ such
that the steady state of the model matches two long-run money demand observations: an
interest semi-elasticity of money demand of ￿.08 and an average velocity level of 3.2. We
choose the leisure parameter ￿ so that households spend about 1/3 of their time working in
the deterministic steady state.
We choose the autocorrelation coe¢ cient for the technology shock to be 0.8, which is
consistent with a quarterly value of 0.95. We choose the autocorrelation coe¢ cient for money
growth to be zero, which is consistent with the average serial correlation of money growth
during the gold standard period. We conducted a sensitivity analysis for this parameter
between ￿0.5 and 0.5 and found that the results were insensitive to this variation.
As in Lucas (1972), the relative size of the innovation variances for the money supply and
the technology shock determine the size of the impact of a money shock on output, and we
label this nonneutrality parameter ￿: Our basic approach is to examine the results across the
full range of nonneutrality values in the model, which extends from a purely neutral model
(￿ = ￿1), to the maximum nonneutrality, in which ￿ = 0: We will tend to focus on ￿ = ￿:5
18because it is the median value, and we also identify the value for ￿ that is implied by the
variances of the productivity and monetary shocks that we calculate over 1930-33, which is
￿ = ￿0:9.15 We will refer to ￿ = ￿0:9 as the "￿xed point" value for ￿:
Table 5 shows the impact of a contractionary money shock that reduces the price level
by 10 percent for di⁄erent values of ￿. The maximum nonneutrality decreases labor input by
about 13 percent from a 10 percent decrease in the price level. The mid-range nonneutrality
(￿ = ￿:5) decreases labor input by about 9 percent in response to a 10 percent unexpected
de￿ ation. The ￿xed point value for ￿ (￿0:9) depresses labor by about 2.6 percent in response
to a 10 percent unexpected de￿ ation.16
5 Model Evaluation
To evaluate the plausibility of the model and of the constructed shocks we make several
comparisons between the model and the data at our benchmark parameterization. For
comparisons between the same variable in the model and in the data, we construct the











i;j is the value of the variable ￿x" from the model and xd
i;j is the value of variable
￿x" from the data. This conformity statistic provides the percentage of squared change in
the variable from 1929 that is explained by the model. It is identical to an R2 measure
without an intercept term. Table 6 summarizes the conformity measures for these variables
for the benchmark parameterization, and for comparative purposes, it shows these measures
for alternative values of the nonneutrality parameter. The comparative results are discussed
at the end of this section.
In some cases, however, data limitations will prevent us from comparing the same object
in the model to that in the data. For example, we compare industrial labor productivity
from the data, which we have for most of our countries, to TFP from the model. In these
cases, we do not expect the objects to move identically, but rather it is reasonable that they
15It is reasonable to wonder why we don￿ t focus exclusively on ￿ = ￿0:9: The main reason is that the
1930-33 period is obviously very unusual, and the derived shocks from this period may have di⁄erent sample
variances than those from the underlying p.d.f. In particular, the actual variance of the productivity shock
was probably larger than was anticipated. This would argue for a higher value of ￿ than -0.9.
16For comparative purposes, note that a model with our production technology, but in which wages are
set in advance, drives down employment 30 percent from a 10 percent unanticipated de￿ ation. This follows
directly from equating the marginal product of labor to the real wage.
19would move similarly. For these cases we will calculate the correlations between the model
and actual variables. To our knowledge, this type of procedure, which is designed to provide
a comprehensive evaluation of model results, has not been used in the DSGE depression
literature, nor has it been used in the broader business cycle literature.
The ￿rst evaluation is for TFP. We have TFP for Canada, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States for each year. The model explains 86% of the change in
TFP for these countries between 1929 and 1933. Figure 2 plots this data, and shows a
strong and systematic relationship between actual productivity and model productivity for
each country and each year.
Our next evaluation makes a broader productivity comparison, but as noted above re-
quires us to compare industrial labor productivity from the data to model productivity,
which is for the entire economy. Given our strategy described above, we calculate the cor-
relation between model TFP and actual industrial labor productivity. We have industrial
labor productivity for 11 countries beginning in 1929 and 14 countries beginning in 1930.17
To provide a benchmark for comparing industrial labor productivity and TFP, we cal-
culated the correlation between U.S. HP-￿ltered industrial labor productivity and U.S. HP-
￿ltered aggregate TFP, which is 0.72. This should be an upper bound on the correlation for
the Depression period, as measurement error in the cross-section in the 1930s is likely larger
than for the postwar U.S., and because of potential structural di⁄erences across countries.
The correlation between model TFP and industrial labor productivity in the data for the set
of 11 and 14 countries are 0.58 and 0.57, respectively. We conclude from these comparisons
that the productivity changes from the model are similar to those in the panel dataset during
the Great Depression.
We next compare the model money stock the actual money stock. Recall we do not
include money demand shocks in our model, since the decomposition results are invariant
to including money demand shocks. But comparing the model money stock to the actual
money stock requires adjusting for money demand shifts as described above. We therefore
compare the implied money demand shock in the model to the money demand shock from
the data, which is given by:
"
D
it = mit ￿ pit ￿ yit + :08iit;
where mit is the actual change in the log of M1, and iit is the change in the nominal interest
17All countries except for Czecholoslovakia, Denmark and Switzerland have industrial labor productivity
beginning in 1930. Within this group of 11 countries, all expect for Austria, France, and Germany have
industrial labor productivity beginning in 1929.
20rate relative to 1929. For the interest rate we use the government discount rate where
available since it is probably the best measure of the opportunity cost of holding money that
we have available, as it is a short-term rate and also is subject to relatively little default risk.
For countries in which we do not have this rate, we used the interest rate that was the most
reasonable proxy for the opportunity cost of holding money.18
Because there are several di⁄erences between the actual monetary measure and the mon-
etary object in the model, we compare the model money demand shocks to those estimated
from the data using correlations, rather than the conformity measure. These include the
fact that countries have di⁄erent levels of ￿nancial development, suggesting country-speci￿c
interest elasticities, that some countries had bank closings during the Depression, and the
well-known di⁄erences between the actual measure of money from the data (M1), and the
pure, non-interest bearing medium of exchange object in the model. Figure 3 shows that
the money demand shocks from the data and the money demand errors in the model are
systematically related. The correlation between the model and data is 0.76.
We now turn to comparing the endogenous variables in the model to their data coun-
terparts. We choose those variables that are central variables in the theory and which we
have at least some data, which are labor, consumption, and wages. We ￿nd that the model
accounts for 77 percent of the change in labor for the 7 countries for which we have aggregate
employment (U.S., Canada, U.K, France, Germany, Australia and Japan). For example, the
actual percentage change in U.S. labor between 1930-33 from 1929 is -6, -14 -25, and -20
percent, respectively (an average decline of 16.3 percent), while in the model it is -8, -15 -22,
and -20 (an average decline of 16.2 percent).
The model accounts for 69 percent of actual consumption change in the set of 8 countries
for which we have consumption data (U.S., Canada, U.K, France, Germany, Australia,
Sweden and Italy). It is worth noting that the model achieves a high coherence despite
the anomalous behavior of consumption in Australia, which declines 2-3 times more than
output declines. (In the other countries, consumption declines less than output). Omitting
Australia from this calculation raises the fraction explained from 69 percent to 78 percent.
The coherence between model consumption and labor and actual consumption and la-
bor indicates that the model is plausibly allocating supply change between the factors of
production and productivity, and is plausibly allocating demand between consumption and
the sum of investment (augmented with net exports, which is theoretically appropriate in
a closed economy framework) and government spending, which tends to be fairly small in
18We have data on the discount rate for the following countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US. For France we use a
money market rate.
21many countries.
The consumption comparison is also informative because it provides a test of our as-
sumptions regarding the persistence of the shocks in the model. Basic permanent income
logic indicates that the magnitude of the fall in consumption, conditional on the fall in out-
put, depends on the persistence of the shocks, as persistent shocks tend to generate a larger
consumption change than temporary shocks. The average consumption decline in the data,
which includes durable consumption, is 6 percent, compared to a 4 percent average decline
in the model. Correcting for consumer durables, which is a form of investment, would reduce
this 2 percent deviation between model and data. We make a rough correction for this by
￿rst noting that durables are about 3 times as volatile as consumption of non-durables and
services, and assume that on average durables were about 15 percent of total consumption.
This implies that the decline in actual consumption corrected for durables is about 5 per-
cent, compared to the model decline of 4 percent. The implication is that the observed large
consumption decline in the data requires a shock with a permanent component of roughly
the size included in the model economy.19
We next compare model wages to industrial wages in the data. This comparison is
signi￿cantly more complicated than for the other variables, however, because of a number
of important measurement issues. These include (1) cyclical compositional changes among
workers, (2) the wage rate in the model is for the aggregate economy, but the measured
wage rate is just for the industrial sector, (3) the size and composition of the industrial
sectors di⁄ers across countries, (4) wage survey methodologies di⁄er across countries, and
(5) data transcription errors may be large for some countries.20 We are able to make some
adjustments for the ￿rst two of these problems but unfortunately not for the others. Thus,
this wage comparison is probably less informative than the other comparisons. Regarding
worker compositional change, the average quality of workers tends to rise during depressions
because the least experienced and least productive employees are typically the ￿rst to be
laid o⁄. We have addressed this measurement problem by compositionally adjusting the
wage rate in the model using the postwar U.S. estimates of cyclical labor composition bias
produced by Solon, Barsky, and Parker (SBP, 1994).21
Table 7 examines the wages from the model. The table makes two comparisons. One
19Unfortunately we do not have su¢ cient information to correct each individual country￿ s consumption
for durables.
20Regarding this latter measurement issue, we found that the nominal wage index in some countries is
implausibly constant (up to a decimal point) for a sequence of years, which will tend to lead to positive real
wage measurement error during de￿ ationary periods.
21The log-deviations in model real wages, w; were generated according to ^ w = w ￿ 0:49 ￿ n; where n, the
employment share, is serving as a proxy for unemployment. We compositionally adjust the model wages
since we have measures of employment in the model for all of our countries.
22is between the model wage and the actual wage, and the other compares the output-wage
relationship from the model to that in the data. For both comparisons, we focus on the
compositionally adjusted model wage.
With the SBP compositional adjustment, the model real wage rises from its 1929 value
in every year except in 1933, though the rise is not as much as in the data. The fact that
the model wage is below the actual mean industrial wage is expected, as real industrial
wages tended to rise more than the aggregate wage. For example, U.S. farm wages fell
considerably in the depression. Adjusting for this fact implies that the gap between the
model￿ s economy-wide wage and actual wages is probably smaller than Table 7 suggests.
Regarding the correlation between the model and actual wage, we provide a benchmark
for interpreting this correlation by reporting the correlation between the aggregate wage
and the industrial wage during postwar U.S. business cycles. We measured the cyclical
correlation between industrial wages and the aggregate wage using postwar U.S. HP-￿ltered
data and obtained a value that ranges between of 0.48 and 0.8, depending on the value of
the smoothing parameter.22 Table 8 shows that the correlation between the model wage and
the actual wage for each of the four Depression years ranges between 0.59 to 0.72. This
means that the correlation between the model wage and the industrial wage is comparable
to that between industrial and economy-wide wages during postwar U.S. business cycles.
A key implication of these wage comparisons is that the inclusion of negative productivity
shocks in the model does not generate lower real wages, as might be expected. Rather, the
combination of modestly non-neutral monetary shocks, with productivity shocks, generates
real wages that are similar to actual wages.
Table 7 also compares the model wage-actual output correlation to the actual wage-
actual output correlation. This comparison is very informative, because it is well known
that single shock models - either monetary or productivity - are inconsistent with output-
wage correlations. Speci￿cally, a monetary shock-sticky wage model generates a -1 correlation
between output and real wages, and a productivity shock-RBC model generates a correlation
near 1. In sharp contrast, this model is consistent with the real wage-output correlation in
3 of the 4 depression years. The only signi￿cant deviation is in 1933, in which the actual
wage-output correlation is below the model wage-output correlation. But the relatively low
1933 correlation is expected, as this is the year in which government labor policies in a
number of countries began (e.g. the NIRA in the United States). The adoption of these
policies will, almost by de￿nition, lower the correlation between the real wage and output.
22The correlation is 0.48 for a smoothing parameter of 400 and is 0.84 for a smoothing parameter of 6.25.
The U.S. annual series are average hourly earnings for manufacturing and average hourly earnings for the
private economy, from 1955 to 2003.
23As discussed earlier, quantifying the impact of these policies in for this panel of countries is
very interesting, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
The conformity of model productivity, money, consumption, labor, and wages to their
data counterparts is very surprising, as there certainly was no presumption prior to the
analysis that such a parsimonious, common-parameter model would perform this well. In
particular, measurement error, the signi￿cant and large heterogeneity of output change across
countries, and the di⁄erences in the stages of development across countries, clearly pose a
signi￿cant challenge to such a simple and common parameter model.
Table 6 also shows these data-model comparisons for other values of the non-neutrality
parameter, ￿: The main ￿nding is that the comparison is not sensitive to values of this
parameter in the moderate nonneutrality range (￿:25 to ￿:75), but the conformity of the
model with the data declines for larger non-neutrality values or for a purely nonneutral model.
To see this, note that the purely neutral model (￿ = ￿1) accounts for only 46 percent of the
change in labor, compared to 76 percent for the mid-range nonneutrality value, while the
maximum nonneutrality (￿ = 0) accounts for 77 percent of TFP compared to 90 percent for
a lower nonneutrality. It is natural to ask whether even larger nonneutrality values generate
worse results. To assess the impact of a larger nonneutrality, we evaluated the conformity of
the standard pre-determined wage model, which is brie￿ y described in the Appendix. This
model is similar to that in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), and Cole and Ohanian
(2002). Model conformity deteriorates considerably in the pre-determined wage model, as it
accounts for only about 26 percent of the change in labor. (For example, the pre-determined
wage model generates a 39 percent decline in labor in the U.S. in 1932, compared to the
actual 25 percent decline). Similarly, the fraction of TFP change that is accounted for by the
pre-determined model is only 34 percent, compared to 86 percent for the benchmark value
in the imperfect information model.
These ￿ndings show that accounting for the data requires a model with a low to moderate
nonneutrality, and explain why the ￿xed point value of (￿ = ￿0:9) is fairly close to neutral
(￿1). Regarding this latter issue, note that monetary shocks in the model need to be
fairly large (about as large as they are in the data) to account for the observed de￿ ation
in the panel. These large monetary shocks preclude a very large nonneutrality, as a large
nonneutrality requires the variance of monetary shocks to be very low.
The main implication of the conformity between the model and the data suggests that it
is reasonable to use the model for the next step in the analysis, which is to decompose output
and price change into orthogonal components due to productivity (the "supply shock") and
money (the "demand shock") in order to assess the relative importance of the two shocks
for understanding output change and de￿ ation.
246 The Relative Contributions of the Shocks
Table 8 presents the contribution of technology and money shocks to the changes in output
and prices for di⁄erent values of the nonneutrality parameter ￿; along with the correlation
between the two shocks. The ￿rst two rows of the table show the fraction of output and
de￿ ator change explained by the monetary shock alone, and by the productivity shock alone.
The second two rows show the fraction explained by the uncorrelated component of the
monetary shock alone, and by the uncorrelated component of the productivity shock alone.
The main ￿ndings are that (i) productivity is about twice as important in accounting for
output, (ii) money is by far the most important shock for explaining prices, and (iii) the
productivity and money shocks are only weakly correlated.
As discussed above, the fact that both shocks have non-zero means generate lower bounds
of the contribution for each shock that sum to more than one. Normalizing the lower bounds
of the contribution of the productivity shock to sum to one, then the fourth row of the table
shows that the lower bound for the contribution of the productivity shock to output ranges
from 75 percent when the nonneutrality is low, to 51 percent at the maximum nonneutrality
of money. At the benchmark nonneutrality of ￿ = ￿0:50 the normalized lower bound for
the contribution of productivity is 63%. Thus, close to 2/3 of the change in output is
conservatively due to productivity.23 The table also shows that money shocks account for
virtually all of the variation in prices. It is not surprising that the contribution of productivity
shocks in isolation to prices is negative, as on average productivity generates lower output,
which in turn raises prices.
These ￿ndings are consistent with the statistics presented in section 2, which indicated
that accounting for de￿ ation and output required two shocks, a shock with a large idio-
syncratic component to account for output, and a shock with a large common component
to account for de￿ ation. Table 9 shows that the productivity and money shocks indeed
have these features. The country-speci￿c share of variation in the productivity shock ex-
ceeds 60 percent each year except 1932, and the country-speci￿c share of variation in the
money shock is less than 40 percent in every year except 1933. Thus, the simple reason why
de￿ ation/monetary shocks account for relatively little of output in the model is the same
reason why de￿ ation statistically accounts for relatively little output change in regression
equation (1): output has a large country-speci￿c component, and de￿ ation is not very highly
correlated with output.
23An alternative to normalizing the output contributions of the two shocks to sum to 1 is to divide the
fraction explained by productivity by the sum of the fractions explained by productivity and money. This
also indicates that productivity accounts for about 2/3 at the benchmark nonneutrality.
25Moreover, this model- based decomposition of output is entirely consistent with a statistical-
based decomposition of output. Speci￿cally, we calculate output from our model with just
the productivity shocks, and compare it to the residuals from the regression of output on
de￿ ation in regression equation (1). The regression residual and output from the model
with just productivity are nearly identical; model output generated just from productiv-
ity accounts for 97 percent of the residual measure of output from the regression. This
last ￿nding highlights the earlier point that the ￿rst-order impact of de￿ ation on output in
the Depression in any log-linear model economy will necessarily be relatively small because
output change is largely country-speci￿c and de￿ ation is not highly correlated with output
change.
Finally, we test whether the decomposition results are sensitive to the assumption of a
common nonneutrality parameter for all the countries. We relax this assumption by speci-
fying the maximum nonneutrality value for the 5 countries with very large output declines
(U.S., Canada, France, Germany, Austria), and the small nonneutrality value for the re-
maining countries with smaller output declines. Since de￿ ation was on average about the
same in both set of countries, this speci￿cation increases the potential explanatory power of
monetary shocks for output by allowing these shocks to have a large e⁄ect on output in the
large depression countries and a smaller e⁄ect in the other countries. The decomposition
results did not change very much, with the relative contribution of productivity shocks for
output falling about 6 percentage points from an average of about 72 percent to 66 percent.
The fact that productivity remains the most important factor for explaining output,
even allowing for heterogeneity in the response of output to de￿ ation, is not so surprising,
as de￿ ation was statistically insigni￿cant in the regression that allowed for country-speci￿c
values for the de￿ ation coe¢ cient. Given the importance of productivity, the following
section investigates the extent that productivity can be explained by various macroeconomic
variables, with the goal of gaining an understanding of the productivity shocks.
7 Understanding the Productivity Shocks
The ￿ndings indicate (i) that output is primarily accounted for by productivity shocks,
(ii) that de￿ ation is accounted for by monetary shocks, and (iii) that productivity, money,
consumption, labor, and wages in the model are similar to those in the data. The next step
is to learn more about these productivity shocks.24
24It would also be interesting to gain a deeper understanding of the money demand shocks that we have
identi￿ed, in a parallel fashion to our approach of analyzing productivity shocks. This would take us beyond
the scope of the paper, however, and we therefore leave this for future research.
267.1 A Framework for Testing Hypotheses about Productivity
This section develops a procedure for learning about these shocks that is based on the sta-
tistical relationship between productivity and other macroeconomic variables. This analysis
is important, irrespective of whether these productivity shocks represent shifts in e¢ ciency,
or are the consequence of some other shock(s), as the growth model is the building block for
DSGE macroeconomic analysis and because productivity shocks are required for the growth
model to conform this well to the data. Thus, if we understand the productivity shocks -
whatever they are - then we can enhance our understanding of the Depression through either
additional analysis with the growth model or augmenting the growth model with additional
factors. But without this analysis of the productivity shocks, it is unclear which direction
to take future DSGE investigations of the International Depression.
However, relatively little progress has been made in understanding the factors that may
be contributing to productivity shocks during postwar business cycles or the Depression. 25
Given that little is known, we frame the following analysis of productivity shocks around
three di⁄erent hypotheses. The ￿rst hypothesis is that the productivity shock is only the
consequence of some other shock(s) in conjunction with either output/input mismeasurement
(e.g. variable capacity utilization), or in conjunction with increasing returns. The implication
of this ￿rst hypothesis is that if we account for variable factor utilization/IRS, and include
shocks other than productivity shocks, then we can understand the Depression using the
basic growth model. The second hypothesis is that the productivity shock represents change
in the e¢ ciency between inputs and output, and that if we understand that process, then
we can understand the Depression as the consequence of productivity change using the basic
growth model.
The third hypothesis exploits the fact that productivity shocks in a standard growth
model are either observationally equivalent to, or are the consequence of, di⁄erent shocks in
more complex growth models. Speci￿cally, some models with shocks to international trade or
￿nancial intermediation can be mapped into the standard growth model with productivity
shocks. The implication of this hypothesis is that understanding the productivity shocks
would indicate classes of richer growth models that are promising for future research. Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) discuss these issues in detail.
Making progress on any of these hypotheses thus requires understanding the source of
25Ohanian (2001) suggests possible factors that contributed to productivity change during the Depression,
but does not carry out any quantitative analysis of these factors. Regading postwar business cycles, Hansen
and Prescott (1991) suggest productivity may be the consequence of changes in government policies and
regulations, though we are unaware of any systematic tests of this hypothesis.
27these shocks. Our approach is to determine if the productivity shocks can be statistically
explained by di⁄erent macroeconomic variables. For example, if the productivity shock can
be explained by ￿nancial intermediation variables, then models with intermediation shocks
would be a promising avenue for further research. We proceed by ￿tting a regression of the
productivity innovation from the model on di⁄erent macro variables: "zit = Xit￿; where "zit
is the productivity innovation, Xit is a vector of macroeconomic variables and ￿ is a vector
of coe¢ cients.
To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst analysis of this type in the DSGE-depression litera-
ture. The covariates we investigate are chosen on the basis of theoretical interest and data
availability. There are ￿nancial variables (a nominal interest rate, an ex-post real interest
rate, the Bernanke-James (1990) measure of banking panics, and the real value of the stock
market), four monetary variables (de￿ ation, M0, M1, M1-M0, which represents the endoge-
nous component of M1)), and one international trade variable (the real exchange rate). All
of these variables are described in detail in the Appendix. We ￿rst estimate regressions with
one variable at a time to maximize the potential explanatory value of each of these variables.
The regressions take the following form, where x represents the single explanatory factor:
"zit = ￿xit + uit:
7.2 Accounting for Productivity with Macroeconomic Variables
Table 10 shows the goodness of ￿t statistic for these regressions, which is the same confor-
mity measure we have used previously. Our main ￿nding is that real stock prices are the
only variable that is substantially related to the productivity innovation, accounting for 40
percent of its sum of squared deviations. Moreover, the correlation between the productivity
innovation and real stock price is 0.70.
Most of the other variables account for little of the productivity innovation. De￿ ation
explains just 1 percent. The monetary base, which is the monetary aggregate most closely
controlled by central banks, explains none of the productivity shock. M1 explains 23 percent,
but this is driven by the endogenous component of M1 (M1-M0) and the covariance between
the base and the endogenous component of M1. Nominal interest rates and real interest
rates are both unimportant, as is the real exchange rate. The Bernanke-James banking
panic variable explains 19 percent.
These results cast doubt on the plausibility of some hypothesis 1 explanations, including
de￿ ation-based and exchange-rate based explanations of productivity through input mismea-
surement such as capacity utilization, labor hoarding, or increasing returns.
28For comparative purposes, the table also presents the conformity measure for each of
these variables (except the banking variable, which is unavailable for this period) in the
same regression estimated using annual U.S. post-World War II data. The most striking
comparison is with the stock market. The explanatory power is only 5 percent in postwar
U.S. data, compared to 40 percent during the depression.
We also evaluated whether the non-stock market variables were jointly important for ex-
plaining the Depression productivity shocks. Speci￿cally, we tested whether de￿ ation, M1,
the nominal interest rate and the banking panic variable add any signi￿cant explanatory
power beyond the stock price variable. They do not - the F statistic for the joint signi￿-
cance of these variables is 1.43, compared to the 5 percent critical value of 2.09. We also
evaluated the joint explanatory power of these other variables without the stock market
in the regression. The explanatory power from the regression from these four variables is
considerably less than that from just the stock market.
We also estimated a ￿xed-e⁄ects regression and the stock market variable to test whether
the stock market is explaining any variation in productivity over time, as the ￿xed-e⁄ects
regression controls for country-speci￿c factors. We ￿nd that this is indeed the case; the stock
market variable is signi￿cant at the 1 percent level (t-statistic = 2.66), which indicates that
the stock market is not just standing in for average cross-country di⁄erences in productivity
change, but rather it can statistically account for changes in productivity over time within
a country. This ￿nding provides further evidence of a signi￿cant relationship between the
stock market and productivity change, and suggests that the most promising channel for
understanding TFP is through a mechanism that is associated with the stock market.
We next test whether there is a signi￿cant relationship between lagged real stock prices
and the productivity innovations. This provides a test of whether the productivity shock was
forecastable, and whether stock prices were possibly reacting to anticipated low economic
activity. This is important because the standard view is that the Depression was due to a long
sequence of transitory and unforcastable shocks (e.g. the Robert Lucas interview in Klamer
(1981)), but this view stands in contrast to the predictable and persistent productivity shocks
in the model economy. This lagged analysis also evaluates whether there is a signi￿cant
relationship between the stock market and productivity after removing the contemporaneous
endogenous component from stock prices.
We therefore regressed the productivity innovations on lagged real stock prices, and
found that the lagged stock market accounts for 32 percent of the productivity innovations.
It is also interesting to note that lagged real stock prices account for 50 percent of the
productivity shock level (as opposed to the innovation) during the Depression, compared to
just one percent in postwar U.S. data. These ￿ndings show that there is a systematic and
29quantitatively important relationship between the stock market and productivity, and that
there is a signi￿cant predictable component of productivity during the Depression.
7.3 Understanding the Change in the Stock-Productivity Rela-
tionship
The very large di⁄erence between the postwar stock-productivity statistical relationship,
and that during the Depression, raises the very interesting question of the source of that
di⁄erence. This subsection evaluates this question, and establishes that virtually all of the
di⁄erence can be accounted for by a change in the size of the productivity shocks within a
common linear statistical model that applies to both periods.
First, we write the log of the deviation in the stock price due to a productivity deviation
(z), and other factors (n); as:
s = ￿z + n = ￿(￿z￿1 + "z) + n:
We now show that the very large change in the stock market-productivity relationship during
the Depression is exactly expected, given the change in the size of the productivity shocks.
To see this, we ￿rst establish the relative sizes of the variances of the productivity shock,
the stock market, and the other factors for the postwar period.
First, normalize the variables by ￿; and recall that the R2 in the postwar period is about
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In the depression, the standard deviation of the productivity innovation rises from 0.006 to
0.037, which implies a 38-fold increase in its variance. Assuming ￿2
n remains in proportion
to ￿2
"z; then it follows that the R2 calculated from a regression of productivity innovations
on the stock market over the 1930-33 period would average about 0.48, which is close to the
30actual R2 of 0.40 that we observe. Thus, the large increase in the productivity-stock market
statistical relationship during the Depression is exactly what is expected, given our ￿nding
of a large increase in the size of the productivity shock during the Depression.
7.4 The Contribution of the Stock Market Component of TFP to
the Depression
Our approach to interpreting the productivity shock and the Depression as causally related to
the stock market has a well-established microeconomic counterpart in the corporate ￿nance
literature. In particular, this literature has compiled considerable microeconomic evidence
on the impact of "￿nancial distress", which the literature broadly de￿nes as a ￿rm having
di¢ culty meeting scheduled debt payments, on stock prices and ￿rm performance, including
pro￿ts and productivity. The ￿ndings from this literature, some of which are summarized
in the Appendix, indicate a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of ￿nancial distress on stock valuation
and ￿rm pro￿ts and productivity. These ￿ndings have motivated the theoretical ￿nance
literature to develop several models that formally link between ￿nancial distress and ￿rm
performance, which are also summarized in the Appendix.
This discussion suggests that a theoretical model with a speci￿c linkage from the stock
market/￿nancial shocks to productivity could be constructed to analyze the Depression.
How much of the Depression could such a model account for? To assess the quantitative
potential of such a model, we conduct a simple analysis with our existing model. The analysis
decomposes productivity into two exogenous components, a stock-related component, and a
residual component as follows:
"zt = ￿st + ￿t
￿ "zt = ￿st;
where "zt is our measured TFP innovation, st is the log-deviation in the real stock price
from 1929, and ￿t is the component of the productivity innovation that is orthogonal to
the stockmarket. We estimate ￿ using OLS over the 1930-33 period from the productivity
innovations and the data on stockmarket indices for the 15 countries for which we have the
stockmarket data.26 We then feed ￿ "zt and our original measure of "￿t into the model and
measure the fraction of output and price changes that the model accounts for using the
conformity measure (5).
The results are promising; the model accounts for 71 percent of squared output change
26We have data on a stockmarket index for all of our countries except Finland and Italy.
31and 93 percent of the squared change in the de￿ ator in the panel between 1929-33. This
indicates that modeling the connection between the stockmarket and TFP in a more com-
plex growth model is a promising approach to gaining a deeper understanding of the Great
Depression.
8 A Comparison with the Literature
We now compare our ￿ndings with other DSGE analyses of the Great Depression. This is
somewhat limited because most of the countries we analyze here have not been previously
studied in the DSGE framework, and because existing analyses tend to focus on a single shock
and also do not conduct the analyses we pursue in terms of comparing the model￿ s predictions
for money, productivity, consumption, labor, and wages, and our analysis of prices. With
this in mind, we note that our ￿nding that productivity shocks are an important factor for
output is consistent with Cole and Ohanian￿ s (1999) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan￿ s
(2006) DSGE analyses of the U.S., with Amaral and McGee￿ s (2002) analysis of Canada,
with Fisher and Hornstein￿ s (2002) analysis of Germany, and Perri and Quadrini￿ s (2002)
analysis of Italy.
Our ￿nding that money shocks, operating through imperfectly ￿ exible wages, also played
some role in accounting for output, is consistent with Fisher and Hornstein for Germany,
with Perri and Quadrini for Italy, with Christiano, Massimo, and Motto (2003) for the U.S.,
and qualitatively with the very interesting work of Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) (hereafter
BEE) for the U.S.27 Quantitatively, however, our ￿ndings indicate that the de￿ ation/wage
channel played a substantially smaller role in accounting for output than BEE conclude. This
is because BEE study the U.S. Depression with only de￿ ationary money shocks operating
through pre-determined wages. BEE￿ s analysis is inconsistent with CKM￿ s demonstration
that shows accounting for the U.S. Depression in a standard growth model requires both
a labor wedge and a productivity wedge. Consequently, the BEE model, or any standard
growth model with just the de￿ ation/sticky wage channel, will generate a counterfactually
large decline in labor and a counterfactully large increase in labor productivity during the
Depression. For example, the pre-determined wage model considered here, which is similar
to BEE, generates a 39 percent U.S. labor decline in 1932, which represents a more than
50 percent error relative to the actual decline of 25 percent. In addition, model labor
27Christiano, Massimo, and Motto use an interesting model that is very di⁄erent from any of the other
papers in the literature, and this complicates a making comparison with our work. However, our ￿nding
that a ￿nancial factor may be central may be related to their ￿ndings about the U.S., which also stress the
role of ￿nancial markets.
32productivity rises 10 percent, compared to the actual 5 percent decline in the data for
1932.
It would be possible to introduce a productivity wedge in the BEE model. This could
be easily done with productivity shocks, which would tend to bring their model results close
to those reported here. Recall, however, that the alternative approach of introducing a
productivity wedge through de￿ ation-induced capacity utilization in a model with just the
de￿ ation/sticky wage channel is inconsistent with the panel data as (i) productivity shocks
are empirically orthogonal to de￿ ation, (ii) real wages are positively correlated with output,
and (iii) de￿ ation explains relatively little of output change.
We are unable to compare our ￿ndings regarding the contribution of productivity and
money for the change in the de￿ ator, regarding the consistency of model versus data for
consumption, labor, money, and wages, and regarding the correlation between productivity
shocks and other variables, such as the stock market, as the other studies in the literature
have not conducted these extended evaluations. It is interesting to note, however, that the
deviations between the model variables and the data in our Depression model are at least
comparable, and in some cases smaller, than model-data deviations measured in equilibrium
path analyses from the postwar period (see the summary of these studies in McGrattan and
Ohanian, 2007).
9 Summary and Conclusion
This paper is the ￿rst DSGE analysis of the International Depression, with the explicit focus
of bringing cross-country evidence to bear on this event. This analysis is a natural ￿rst
step in this process, given the increasing use of DSGE modeling of single-country Depression
analyses and given the long-standing interest in exploiting cross-country evidence. The
contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) We show that accounting for both de￿ ation and output in the international cross sec-
tion cannot be accomplished with a single shock, but rather requires a multi-factor ap-
proach. Speci￿cally, any model must confront the fact that there is enormous real output
heterogeneity across countries, despite de￿ation homogeneity across countries. The princi-
pal shock(s) driving output thus must have a large country-speci￿c component, while the
principal shock(s) driving de￿ ation must have a large common component.
(2) We develop a stochastic growth model, that includes a monetary misperceptions mech-
anism in the spirit of Lucas (1972). Requiring the model to exactly match output and
de￿ ation generates changes in productivity, money, consumption, and labor in the model
33that account for about 70-90 percent of the actual changes in these variables, and generates
wage movements that are very similar to those in the data, and generate a wage-output cor-
relation that is very similar to that in the data. The productivity shock has a large country
speci￿c component and the monetary shock has a large common component.
(3) We ￿nd that accounting for the Depression in a growth model requires large productivity
shocks; about 2/3 of the Depression is conservatively accounted for by productivity, and
about 1/3 by monetary shocks. The fact that de￿ ation and output are largely orthogonal
in the panel means that de￿ ation will have a very limited explanatory role in any log-linear
model.
(4) We correlated the productivity shocks with several macro variables to gain an understand-
ing of productivity. Stock prices are by far the most important predictor of the productivity
shocks, with a correlation of about 0.7. Other explanations, including capacity utilization
operating through de￿ ation, interest rates, exchange rates, or base money, are uncorrelated
with productivity. Presuming that the causality runs from changes in asset values to TFP, we
￿nd that the stock-market related component of productivity and the money shocks account
for 71 percent of output changes and 93 percent of price change in the panel.
(5) Our statistical and model-based ￿ndings have implications for studies that have focused
on the gold standard. One implication is that our analysis strongly indicates that the inter-
national de￿ ation was the result of the international monetary contraction, with monetary
shocks accounting for virtually all of the de￿ ation in the model. This provides model-based
evidence that complements the empirical and narrative analyses that argue de￿ ation was
indeed the consequence of monetary shocks associated with the international gold standard
(see Eichengreen (1991)). In contrast, both our statistical and model-based ￿ndings indicate
that monetary-de￿ ation forces played a smaller role in the output decline of the international
Depression than has been suggested by the gold standard literature.
The conformity of this parsimonious model with the data is very surprising because of the
common speci￿cation across countries, because of the di⁄erent stage of development across
countries and other country-speci￿c factors, because of measurement error, and because
we have excluded several other factors from the model that are cited in the International
Depression literature. The conformity of this model with the data thus indicates that if
other factors are quantitatively important, then within the context of the growth model that
importance primarily operates through the productivity channel of the model.
Accounting for the International Depression in the growth model requires large produc-
tivity shocks that are largely orthogonal to de￿ ation, monetary factors, and interest rates
and exchanges rates. Thus, understanding the depression requires understanding these pro-
ductivity shocks. The fact that the stock market is the only variable closely related to
34productivity means that the most promising avenue for understanding these productivity
shocks, and gaining a deeper understanding of the international depression, is through a
model that theoretically connects productivity to ￿nancial market imperfections. Develop-
ing and tailoring such a model for the International Depression is important future work.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Data
The primary data source of the data is B.R. Mitchell￿ s International Historical Statistics.
This includes most of the data on real and nominal GDP, industrial wages, production and
prices, as well as the agricultural and industrial shares of GDP. Data on the stock market
and gold parities come from the League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks from 1933 to 1940.
Where available, we have used the latest o¢ cial publications of historical data. This includes
the data for Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We
have also endeavored to use the latest revisions of data where available. This includes the
data for France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden. Listed bellow are the data sources by country.
Unless otherwise indicated, the data used are from B.R. Mitchell and the League of Nations.
Australia
Nominal and real GDP, GDP de￿ ator: Butlin, M.W., 1977, A Preliminary Annual Data-
base 1900/01 to 1973/74, Research Discussion Paper 7701, Reserve Bank of Australia.
Industrial production, price and wage indices: Australian Historical Statistics (Wray
Vamplew, ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Canada




Nominal and real GDP, GDP de￿ ator, industrial production: Beaudry, P., and Portier,
F., 2002, The French Depression in the 1930s. Review of Economic Dynamics 5 (January):
73￿ 99
Note that the data provided by Beaudry and Portier were derived from data in Villa,
P., 1993, Une Analyse macro-Economique de la France au XXieme Siecle. Paris: Presses du
CNRS.
Germany
Nominal and real GDP, GDP de￿ ator, industrial wages: Fisher, J., and Hornstein, A.,
2002, The Role of Real Wages, Productivity, and Fiscal Policy in Germany￿ s Great Depres-
sion, 1928￿ 1937, Review of Economic Dynamics 5 (January): 100￿ 127
Italy
Nominal and real GDP, GDP de￿ ator, industrial wages, production, and prices: Perri,
F., and Quadrini, V., 2002, The Great Depression in Italy: Trade Restrictions and Real
Wage Rigidities, Review of Economic Dynamics 5 (January) 128￿ 151.
Note that the data provided by Perri and Quadrini were based on data in (i) Ercolani,
P., 1978, Documentazione Statistica di Base in (G. Fua), Lo sviluppo Economico in Italia, 3:
388￿ 472, and (ii) Rey, G., 1991, I Conti Economici dell￿ Italia, Bari: Laterza.
Japan
Industrial prices and wages: (i) Hundred-Year Statistics (100 Years) of the Japanese
Economy, 1966, Statistis Department, Bank of Japan, and (ii) Supplement to Hundred-Year
Statistics of the Japanese Economy (English translation of footnotes).
Sweden
Real GDP, GDP de￿ ator, industrial production, prices, and wages: John Hassler￿ s data
set at (http://hassler-j.iies.su.se/SWEDATA/).
Note that the data used from Hassler￿ s data set were derived from Krantz, O., and Nils-
son, C-A., 1975, Swedish National Product, 1861￿ 1970, Lund.
39United Kingdom
Nominal and real GDP, GDP de￿ ator, industrial production, prices, and wages: Feinstein,
C.H., 1972, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855￿ 1965,
Cambridge University Press.
United States
Nominal and real GDP, GDP de￿ ator for 1919￿ 29: Romer, C., 1989, The Prewar Business
Cycle Reconsidered: New Estimates of Gross National Product, 1869￿ 1908.
Nominal and real GDP, GDP de￿ ator for 1929￿ 40: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.2B and Fixed Asset Tables, Table 1.2.
Industrial production: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, series FRB
B50001.
Industrial prices: Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, part
1, (HSUS), U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Industrial wages: Hanes, C., 1996, Changes in the Cyclical Behavior of Real Wage Rates,
1870￿ 1990, Journal of Economic History.
10.2 Choice of Price Index
We use the GNP de￿ ator as a price index in our modelling and in our calculations because
it is a measure of ￿nal goods prices. The empirical literature, which focuses on sticky wage
models, including (Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), Bernanke and Carey (1996)) use the WPI,
which is inappropriate because this index is not the price of ￿nal output, which is required
for the sticky wage model, but rather the WPI is a bundle of input prices. Tables A3 and A4
report the composition of the wholesale price index and the industrial production index for a
number of countries. Two things stand out. First, the wholesale price index is largely based
on a bundle of raw input prices, and second, the correspondence between the composition of
the wholesale price index and the industrial production index is very poor. For example, in
Czechoslovakia the WPI puts a weight of 78% on agricultural, mining and energy products,
while the industrial production index puts a weight of 73% on manufacturing products. In
France the WPI puts a weight of 44% on food and agricultural products while the industrial
production index puts a weight of 0% on these same products.
4010.3 Irrelevance of Money Demand Shocks
Conditional on the price change, the impact of a money supply or money demand shock
on output, labor and the wage rate is the same. To see this, consider the follow three log-
linearized equations, where lower case variables denote log-deviations from the steady state.
The ￿rst equation is the optimal labor condition of the household, the second is the optimal
employment condition of the ￿rm, and the third is the production function.
w(t) ￿ (n(t) ￿ N=(1 ￿ N)) = ￿Ef￿(t)jw((t); ￿ s(t)g;
p(t) + z(t) + ￿(k(t) ￿ n(t) = w(t)
y(t) = z(t) + ￿k(t) + (1 ￿ ￿)n(t)
The ￿rst equation implicitly determines the labor supply schedule given the wage and the
second determines the labor demand schedule. Note ￿rst that the labor demand schedule
depends only on the change in the price, and not whether the change came from a money
supply or money demand shock. Similar, Ef￿(t)jw(t); ￿ s(t)g doesn￿ t depend upon the source
of the observed wage change. Hence, these two schedules are the same irrespective of whether
the price change came from a money demand or supply shock and they therefore yield the
same equilibrium levels of the wage, employment, and output.
10.4 Pre-Determined Wage Model
The environment of the pre-determined wage model di⁄ers only in that aggregate labor is a
CES function of individual labor. This is included so that individual workers are able to set








The system of equations characterizing the equilibrium of the pre-determined wage model
is the same as the misperceptions model with the exception of the equation relating the
wage, the disutility of e⁄ort, and the marginal utility of wealth. This condition in the














￿B=(1 ￿ Nt) + WtEf￿tjWt;Kt;zt￿1;￿t￿1g = 0:
When we log-linearize, this di⁄erence e⁄ects the aggregate steady state values around which
we linearize, and the conditioning in the expectation of log deviation in ￿; which is the
marginal value of nominal wealth: Otherwise, the equations in the two models are identical.
10.5 Financial Distress, Stock Valuation, and Firm Performance:
Theory and Evidence
The corporate ￿nance literature has evaluated both the direct and the indirect costs of
￿nancial distress, which is generally taken to mean di¢ culty meeting scheduled ￿x payments.
The direct costs include the administrative costs and legal fees associated with bankruptcy,
which have been estimated to be around 4% of market value.28 The indirect costs include
misplaced managerial e⁄ort, costly reductions in capital and sales of assets at depressed
prices. While not all of these costs will translate into falls in measure TFP, some of them,
such as misplaced managerial e⁄ort and the potential misallocation of capital can.
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) examine highly leveraged ￿rms in order to evaluate the
impact of pure ￿nancial distress, which they de￿ned as either defaulting on a debt payment
or attempting to restructure its debt because of di¢ culty making a debt payments. While
economic and ￿nancial distress is always di¢ cult to entangle, their focus on very highly
leveraged ￿rms helps to isolate ￿rms in which leverage was a critical factor in their di¢ culties
making payments rather than their simply no longer being viable economic units, as in many
prior studies of the impact of bankruptcy. In their sample, all of the ￿rms had positive
operating margins when they became distress, and these margins typically exceed their
industry median. Even more strikingly, the median distressed ￿rm in their sample had
earnings of nearly 4 times the median interest expense for their industry. Moreover, they
￿nd that the onset of ￿nancial distress is generally delayed by the fact that ￿rms in their
sample generally out performed their industry and their industry perfomrance improved
relative to the prior year. For these reasons, Andrade and Kaplan conclude that they have
isolated "a sample of ￿rms for whom leverage is the primary if the not the sole source of
￿nancial distress" (p. 1457). They ￿nd that ￿rms that experienced ￿nancial distress lost
10 to 20 percent of their market value. They also found that operating and net cash ￿ ow
margins declined between 10 and 15 percent while the ￿rms were distressed.
Opler and Titman (1994) take a somewhat di⁄erent tack in trying to distinguish isolate
28See Altman (1984), Ang et al (1982), Warner (1977) and Weiss (1990).
42the impact of ￿nancial distress from economic distress by looking at the interaction of eco-
nomic and ￿nancial distress. They look at industries which have had a negative economic
shock, which they de￿ne as a 3-digit SIC industry with negative sales growth and a median
stock return below -30%. They examine the di⁄erential response of ￿rms within the indus-
try based upon their degree of leverage. They found that ￿rms with high leverage ratios
performed substantially worse with, ￿rms in the highest decile of leverage having 25% lower
sales growth. As a result, these more highly leveraged ￿rms lost market share.
There is considerable microeconomic evidence that also shows a strong statistical rela-
tionship between productivity and changes in asset values. Maksimovic and Phillips (1998)
is perhaps the most comprehensive study that studies the impact of the ￿nancial distress
associated with ￿ling for bankruptcy (Chapter 11). They analyze 1195 manufacturing plants
of 302 ￿rms that ￿led for Chapter 11 between 1977 and 1990, and a control group of over
50,000 plants of non-bankrupt ￿rms. They compared plant-level productivity in the ￿nan-
cially distressed ￿rms to TFP all ￿rms, and also to TFP across industry groups that di⁄er
by varying levels of ￿nancial distress associated with demand shocks.29 For these industry
groups, the lowest industry grouping consisted of those that were signi￿cantly distressed
(very negative long-run demand shocks associated with long-run declining industries), and
the highest industry grouping consisted of those were not distressed (very positive demand
shocks associated with rapidly expanding industries). They found that TFP was low in
the ￿nancially distressed ￿rms, and systematically higher in ￿rms that were in expanding
industries, indicating that ￿nancial distress is associated with low TFP.
In particular, they found that TFP in distressed ￿rms for the two years before ￿ling for
Chapter 11 was about 4.5 percent lower compared to all plants, and as much as 15 percent
lower than plants in industries with the most positive demand shocks. During the ￿rst year
of Chapter 11, the plants of distressed ￿rms had productivity that was 9 percent below all
￿rms, and almost 19 percent below those in industries with the most positive demand shocks.
Three years after entering Chapter 11 the productivity of the plants of distressed ￿rms was
almost 37 percent below those in the industries with positive demand shocks. Productivity
continued to be low after leaving Chapter 11. Relative to all ￿rms, the plants of ￿rms exiting
Chapter 11 had productivity that was about 9-16 percent lower 1-3 years after Chapter 11.
Moreover, productivity was also very low for plants in ￿rms which were not bankrupt but
were experiencing considerable ￿nancial distress. Speci￿cally, the productivity in the lowest
quartile of these shocks was not very di⁄erent from the productivity in the plants of bankrupt
￿rms.
29TFP is adjusted for variation in capacity utilization.
43Regarding models that connect ￿nancial shocks to ￿rm performance, Kyotaki and Moore
(1997), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Carlstom and Fuerst (1997) develop models in
a decline in asset values values reduce inputs and output through a net worth constraint
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2006) shows how disturbances to the e¢ cient mix of inputs
resulting from a ￿nancial shock reduces TFP in this class of models.
There are other channels through which a decline in asset values could lower TFP. If
a decline in stock prices signals a greater likelihood that the ￿rm would fail or contract
in size, agency frictions within the ￿rm would rise, which would tend to reduce output
and productivity. This channel follows from the classic Folk theorem results in games of
incomplete information (e.g. Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin). In addition, there is a class of
models that formalize how agency and other informational frictions within the ￿rm evolve
over time, including Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 1997, Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini
(2003), and Atkeson and Cole (2006). In all of these models, any factor that reduces the
expected duration of the relationship between the principal and the agent, such as a decline
in the share price, exacerbates the importance of the agency friction. The increases in
these frictions lead to increases in monitoring costs, ine¢ cient rent-seeking, diversion of
investments to less e¢ cient uses, and a an increased di¢ culty in generating optimal choices
of privately observed actions, such as e⁄ort. All of these e⁄ects would reduce measured TFP
and output.
4411 Tables
Table 1: Sample Statistics: Log Deviation of Output (Y)
and Log change in De￿ ator30
Mean Idiosyncratic Share Correlation
Year Y ￿ Y ￿ Y and ￿
1930 0.00 -0.05 0.99 0.35 -0.27
1931 -0.06 -0.07 0.61 0.13 -0.27
1932 -0.10 -0.05 0.55 0.46 0.54
1933 -0.08 -0.02 0.70 0.75 0.29
1934 -0.04 0.00 0.92 1.00 0.05
1935 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.92 0.40
1936 0.04 0.03 0.91 0.62 -0.14
1937 0.11 0.06 0.66 0.47 -0.12
30Output is measured as the log deviation from 1929, ￿ is the annual log change in the de￿ ator, the
idiosyncratic share is the fraction of the change in the variable accounted for by the non-mean component.
45Table 2: Output (Y) and De￿ ator (￿) in 1932




















Idiosyncratic Share 0.55 0.18
46Table 3: Sample Statistics: Real Wages
Data are log deviations from 1929 values
Correlation









Table 4: Benchmark Parameters
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿z ￿￿
.33 .95 .92 .07 .5 .80 .00
Table 5: Impact of a 10 Percent De￿ ation on Labor








47Table 6. Model and Data Comparisons:
for Di⁄erent Nonneutralitiy Values (￿)
Variable to be Explained ￿ = ￿ = ￿ = ￿ = ￿ = ￿ =
0:00 ￿:25 ￿:50 ￿:75 ￿:90 ￿1:00
Percentage of Data Explained by Model
TFP 77 81 86 90 87 74
Aggregate Labor 70 74 77 77 67 47
Consumption 66 67 69 70 71 73
Correlation Between Model and Data
Money Demand Shocks 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.78
Table 7. Comparing Industrial Wage Data to Model Wage
(Right panel adjusted for compositional change, left panel unadjusted)31
Model w Adj. Model w
Year mean correlation mean correlation
1930 0.03 0.73 0.04 0.72
1931 0.02 0.59 0.06 0.61
1932 -0.02 0.53 0.02 0.59
1933 -0.04 0.49 -0.02 0.66
31We adjusted wages according to
w￿ = w ￿ :49 ￿ u;
where u was our proxy for unemployment which is simply minus employment.
48Table 8. Output (Y) and Price Level (P) Decomposition Bounds
Percentage of Variation Explained by Money and Productivity Shocks
￿ = :00 ￿ = ￿:25 ￿ = ￿:50 ￿ = ￿:75 ￿ = ￿:90
Variable Y P Y P Y P Y P Y P
"￿ 48% 94% 46% 94% 41% 93% 29% 91% 15% 89%
"z 68% <0% 75% <0% 84% <0% 94% <0% 99% <0%
"￿ ￿ cov("z;"￿) 49% 94% 44% 95% 37% 96% 25% 97% 12% 96%
"z ￿ cov("z;"￿) 68% <0% 74% <0% 80% <0% 88% <0% 89% <0%
corr("z;"￿) 0.08 0.15 0.24 0.38 0.48
Table 9: Statistical Summary of the Shocks
with benchmark nonneutrality (￿ = ￿0:50)
"z "￿
Idiosyncratic Idiosyncratic Correlation
Year Mean Share Mean Share "z & "￿
1930 0.02 0.81 -0.04 0.33 -0.24
1931 -0.02 0.77 -0.09 0.08 0.03
1932 -0.03 0.44 -0.07 0.37 0.27
1933 -0.01 0.94 -0.03 0.68 0.28
49Table 10: R2 - Productivity Innovations Regressed on Macro Variables
Cross-Country Depression Data versus Postwar U.S. Data
Independent Variable R2 ￿ Depression R2 ￿ Postwar US
Change in Log De￿ ator 0.01 0.02
Nominal Interest Rate 0.02 0.11
Real Interest Rate 0.02 0.10




Bernanke-James Bank Variable 0.19 NA
Real Stock Price 0.40 0.05
5012 Appendix Tables
Table A1: Log Deviations in Output and Productivity32
Output Productivity
Country 1930 1931 1932 1933 1930 1931 1932 1933
Australia 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.05* 0.01* 0.03* 0.04*
Canada -0.05 -0.18 -0.29 -0.36 -0.03 -0.13 -0.18 -0.22
France -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08
Germany -0.07 -0.20 -0.28 -0.20 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03
Japan 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.00* 0.06* 0.06* 0.08*
U.K 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
U.S. -0.09 -0.15 -0.30 -0.31 -0.06 -0.09 -0.18 -0.20
Table A2: Log TFP Deviations from 1929
Model (￿ = ￿0:50)
Country 1930 1931 1932 1933
Canada -0.02 -0.09 -0.14 -0.21
France 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.00
Germany -0.04 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10
U.K. 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
U.S. -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -0.17
32The productivity measure is labor productivity if the variable has an ￿*￿and total factor productivity
otherwise.
51Table A3. Sample Statistics for Industrial Production and
Industrial Wages De￿ ated by Producer Price Index33
Correlations Country-Speci￿c Component
Year IP & W/WPI IP & W/CPI IP W/PPI
1930 0.14 0.21 0.64 0.18
1931 0.12 0.15 0.24 0.23
1932 -0.28 0.07 0.29 0.41
1933 -0.20 0.35 0.50 0.42
1934 -0.43 -0.05 0.73 0.56
1935 -0.28 0.00 0.95 0.99
1936 -0.72 -0.38 0.95 0.73
1937 -0.88 -0.56 0.59 0.94
33The following countries are not included for some or all years due to data availability: Switzerland for
all years, Austria from 1935 onwards, and Czechoslovakia in 1937.
52Table A4. Composition of Wholesale Price Index34
Country Food & Ag. Min., Met. & Energy Ind. Prods. Misc.
Australia 0.637 0.132 0.231 0
Austria 0.691 0.309 0 0
Canada 0.337 0.296 0.367 0
Czechoslovakia 0.325 0.458 0.216 0
Denmark 0.385 0.615 0 0
Finland 0.496 0 0.313 .192
France 0.444 0.156 .4 0
Germany 0.28 0.41 0.13 0.18
Hungary 0.444 0.192 0.23 0.134
Italy 0.431 0.157 0.412 0
Japan 0.268 0.089 0.482 0.161
Netherlands 0.583 0 0 0.417
Norway 0.546 0.177 0.257 0.02
Sweden 0.496 0.16 0.319 0
Switzerland 0.167 0 0.333 0.5
34All numbers are from various years of the League of Nations￿Statistical Yearbook
53Table A5. Composition of Industrial Production35
Country Food & Ag. Mining, Metals & Energy Manufacturing Misc.
Canada 0.323 0.291 0.367 0
Czechoslovakia 0.07 0.2 0.73 0
Denmark 0.408 0.38 0.212 0
France 0 0.07 0.43 0.5
Germany 0.15 0.232 0.606
Hungary 0.256 0.235 0.509 0.134
Norway 0.371 0.236 0.393
Sweden 0.359 0.35 0.291 0
35All numbers are from various years of the League of Nations￿Statistical Yearbook
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